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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two years, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals decided a number of cases regarding confessions,
and searches and seizures. The Supreme Court established several new
nuances in these areas while the court of criminal appeals clarified the
existing law’s applicability under unique facts. This article covers the most
significant confession, and search and seizure cases decided during this
two-year period. Each section identifies recent decisions in the subcat-
egories of both confession, and search and seizure, and analyzes the juris-
prudential significance of these decisions.
There has been no new development from the Supreme Court inter-
preting confession law in the past two years. The court of criminal ap-
peals, however, handed down two cases during this time addressing
questions regarding custodial interrogations and confessions elicited by
government agents. The most dramatic changes for both the Supreme
Court and the court of criminal appeals involve search and seizure law.
The Supreme Court provided new interpretations for reasonable suspi-
cion and expanded who may challenge a search or seizure. On the other
hand, the court of criminal appeals provided guidance and clarification on
how this new precedent applies in unique factual circumstances.
II. CONFESSIONS
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment,1 provides that “[n]o person . . . shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”2 In
Miranda v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the Fifth
Amendment serves as a clear and unwavering commitment to protect in-
dividuals from government overreach.3 Miranda specifically requires po-
lice to inform suspects of their right to remain silent and right to counsel
during a custodial interrogation.4
A. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
A custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way.”5 A court determines
whether an individual was in custody based on objective circumstances by
considering (1) the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and (2)
whether a reasonable person in those circumstances would have felt free
to leave.6 Questioning constitutes interrogation when an officer’s ques-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (incorporating
the privilege against self-incrimination).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
4. Id. at 467–70.
5. Id. at 444.
6. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
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tions are “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”7 This
questioning, combined with custody, triggers the Miranda warning re-
quirement.8 A suspect’s self-incriminating statement made during custo-
dial interrogation, absent Miranda warnings, will be held
unconstitutional.9 In Texas, the right is codified in Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure Article 38.22,10 which requires police to admonish suspects of
their rights and mandates that any confession obtained during an interro-
gation, absent such admonishments, is inadmissible at trial.11
1. State v. Cruz
Routine booking questions are an exception to the Miranda rule.12
Such questions typically arise after arrest and “serve a legitimate adminis-
trative need.”13 Examples include name, address, physical description,
birth date, and age.14 A court does not consider a request for this bio-
graphical information as interrogation because the information does not
tend to result in producing an incriminating response.15 Moreover, the
information may be part of a routine, administrative inquiry that serves
legitimate purposes beyond criminal investigations.16
Despite this widely accepted exception, a question arose in State v.
Cruz concerning whether routine booking questions create a per se rule
that makes statements made in response to routine questions always ad-
missible. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that, while questions
commonly part of routine booking procedures are admissible, there are
circumstances in which a court must suppress statements in response to
questions asked outside of the booking procedure or absent an adminis-
trative purpose.17
In Cruz, officers investigated a murder and discovered a fingerprint
matching Cruz, who had several aliases and an outstanding Illinois war-
rant.18 Texas officers contacted U.S. Marshals in Illinois who then ar-
rested Cruz on the outstanding warrant and booked Cruz into jail in
Illinois. The Texas officers travelled to Illinois and interviewed Cruz with-
out Miranda warnings. Nor did they reveal the agency for which they
worked.19 The Texas officers asked Cruz several biographical questions
including his name, birth date, address, phone number, whether he
owned a cell phone, who he lived with, and how long he had been in the
7. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980).
8. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45.
9. Id. at 444.
10. TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 2(a) (West 2013).
11. Id. §§ 2–3.
12. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990).
13. Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
14. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601; Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 654.
15. State v. Cruz, 461 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 540.
18. Id. at 533–34.
19. Id. at 534.
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United States. After Cruz provided all the requested information, the of-
ficers read him the Miranda warnings and Cruz immediately requested an
attorney.20 Based on the information Cruz provided, the Texas officers
searched his house and discovered his birth certificate with his actual
name and birth date.21 And using the cell phone number he provided,
officers also seized cell phone records that showed the phone was near
the crime scene on the date of the murder.22
The trial judge granted Cruz’s pretrial motion to suppress with respect
to the interview but denied the motion with respect to the booking ques-
tions Illinois officers asked, fingerprints obtained upon arrest, cell phone
records, and evidence discovered at Cruz’s residence.23 The court of ap-
peals held that the interview statements were admissible under the rou-
tine booking exception because officers would not have known that the
answers would elicit an incriminating response.24
The court of criminal appeals, however, disagreed and held that while
the questions were biographical in nature, that fact alone does not pre-
clude such questions from constituting an interrogation.25 Biographical
questions can transform into an interrogation when, a reasonable person
in a similar position would have understood that answering such a ques-
tion would be evidence of consciousness of guilt for a criminal offense.26
Examining the question’s content and the totality of circumstances sur-
rounding the question, the court of criminal appeals held that the officers
knew or should have known that their question about Cruz’s cell phone
number would lead to an incriminating response.27 Because the Texas of-
ficers did not book Cruz and thus, could not exercise any formal authority
over him, the officers’ questions did not relate to any administrative
needs or routine booking procedures.28
B. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The Fifth Amendment protects individuals from being compelled in a
criminal case to act as witnesses against themselves.29 Similarly, the Sixth
Amendment provides the right to counsel that requires an attorney’s
presence during police questioning when an individual invokes the
right.30 Statements are inadmissible at any trial against the individual for
20. Id.
21. Id. at 535.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 535–36.
25. Id. at 538–39 (citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990)).
26. Id. at 539–40 (citing Felder v. State, 848 S.W.2d 85, 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
27. Id. at 540.
28. Id. at 542.
29. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984).
30. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206–07 (1964) (holding that a defen-
dant’s self-incriminating statements that law enforcement deliberately elicited after indict-
ment and absent counsel cannot be used against him at trial).
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any offense if the statements are obtained illegally.31 The privilege also
prohibits the State from commenting on a defendant’s refusal to testify at
trial32 and prohibits the court from revoking probation when a defendant
legitimately exercises the right.33 A violation occurs only when the gov-
ernment or a government agent acts. A person will be considered an
agent, or at least an informant, if the person “[has] at least . . . some sort
of agreement with, or act[s] under instructions from, a government
official.”34
1. Rubalcado v. State
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined whether a victim
who called the defendant to elicit incriminating responses acted as a gov-
ernment agent.35 In this case, the victim called Rubalcado on three occa-
sions. On each occasion, the victim was supervised by the officer and used
law enforcement recording equipment.36 In doing so, the officer intended
the victim to elicit a confession from Rubalcado. On all three occasions,
however, Rubalcado referenced his attorney.37
In Rubalcado, the court of criminal appeals did not establish a bright-
line rule determining when a person becomes a government agent, but
instead provided a rough guideline for future litigants.38 The court of
criminal appeals looked to how other jurisdictions determine when an
informant becomes a government agent.39 The other jurisdictions essen-
tially evaluate a government agency relationship on whether a person acts
under an arrangement with the government with the expectation of some
benefit or advantage.40 In other words, the question is whether a quid pro
quo relationship between the individual and the government exists.41
Here, the court of criminal appeals concluded that the victim in this case
was a government agent because the officer (1) encouraged the victim to
call and elicit a confession; (2) supplied the victim with the recording
equipment; and (3) was present during each call.42 Thus, through its anal-
ysis of other jurisdictions, the Rubalcado court provided a rough guide-
line from which litigants may structure their arguments.43
31. Rubalcado v. State, 424 S.W.3d 560, 572–73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Thomp-
son v. State, 108 S.W.3d 269, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (per curiam) (Keasler, J., dissent-
ing against the court’s refusal to grant rehearing on its own motion)).
32. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
33. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 438.
34. Manns v. State, 122 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
35. Rubalcado, 424 S.W.3d at 576.
36. Id. at 564.
37. Id. at 565–66.
38. See id. at 576.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., People v. Dement, 264 P.3d 292, 318 (Cal. 2011).
41. Creel v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 385, 394 (5th Cir. 1998).
42. Rubalcado, 424 S.W.3d at 576.
43. See id.
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III. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation.”44 An individual must satisfy several threshold issues to
successfully raise a Fourth Amendment challenge. First, an individual
must have “a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded space” and
establish the government’s intrusion.45 A legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy is measured by (1) the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy
in the person, place, or thing searched; and (2) an objective inquiry about
whether society is prepared to accept such an expectation as reasona-
ble.46 Second, the intrusion must constitute a search.47 This element, how-
ever, is judged according to a relatively low standard.48 Even a minor
trespass into a protected area for the purposes of gathering information
for prosecution constitutes a search.49
A. PROPERTY-BASED FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Recently, with regards to the first threshold issue, both the U.S. Su-
preme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed who
can assert a Fourth Amendment challenge and how those challenges will
be reviewed. The Supreme Court found that a group of similarly situated
individuals or persons may raise a facial challenge under the Fourth
Amendment.50 The court of criminal appeals held that a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy gives an individual standing to raise a Fourth
Amendment challenge.51 Additionally, the Supreme Court clarified its
position on co-tenant consent for warrantless searches.52
1. City of Los Angeles v. Patel
Los Angeles had a municipal code that required hotels to record guest
information and provide it to any Los Angeles police officer to inspect.53
The code classified a failure to provide the information to the police as a
misdemeanor.54 A group of hotel operators raised a facial challenge to
the code under the Fourth Amendment.
The district court held for the city and found that the hotel operators
44. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
45. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
46. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
47. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. City of L.A. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2448 (2015).
51. See Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
52. See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1129–30 (2014).
53. Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2447–48.
54. Id. at 2448.
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“lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records.”55 A divided
panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, but sitting en banc, reversed. The
Ninth Circuit held that the code violated the Fourth Amendment because
it allowed records inspection without providing for a neutral and de-
tached magistrate to assess reasonableness against the threat of criminal
prosecution for failing to comply.56
The U.S. Supreme Court first examined whether facial challenges could
be brought on Fourth Amendment claims and held such claims are per-
missible because facial challenges can be brought under the First and Sec-
ond Amendments, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
and the Foreign Commerce Clause.57 The Supreme Court then held that
the code was facially unconstitutional because it “fail[ed] to provide hotel
operators with an opportunity for precompliance review.”58
In the Supreme Court’s eyes, the code had to provide an opportunity
for precompliance review.59 Specifically, the Supreme Court warned,
“Absent an opportunity for precompliance review, the ordinance creates
an intolerable risk that searches authorized by it will exceed statutory
limits, or be used as a pretext to harass hotel operators and their
guests.”60 A search authorized by the code is per se unreasonable if not
approved by a judge or magistrate before the search, unless the search
also falls within a prescribed exception.61 “This rule ‘applies to commer-
cial premises as well as to homes.’”62 Warrantless searches, however, may
be reasonable in special needs circumstances and where the primary pur-
pose is not criminal prosecution.63 But the Supreme Court explained that,
even if the search was for administrative purposes—one that ensures
compliance and deters criminals from operating criminal enterprises—
”the subject of the search must be afforded an opportunity to obtain
precompliance review before a neutral decision maker.”64 The Supreme
Court emphasized that the hotel operator need only have the opportunity
for a neutral decision maker to review the officer’s demand for a search.65
2. Matthews v. State
In Matthews v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a
person who legitimately borrowed a vehicle has standing to challenge the
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2449–50 (discussing Sibron’s application that essentially held that Fourth
Amendment facial attacks are unlikely to succeed when “there is substantial ambiguity as
to what conduct a statute authorizes”).
58. Id. at 2451.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2452–53.
61. Id. at 2452.
62. Id. (quoting Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)).
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 545 (1967);
Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984)).
65. Id.
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vehicle’s search.66 In Matthews, officers received an anonymous tip about
a black man named Neil Matthews, who wore a white muscle tee and
dark pants, and sold crack out of a white van in front of a food store.67
The officers knew it was a high-crime area. When officers arrived on the
scene they found Matthews inside a van and dressed according to the
tipster’s description. The officers approached Matthews, but because it
was dark and a high-crime area, they asked him to step out of the van so
they could see his hands.68 When Matthews did not respond, the officers
ordered him to exit the van. The officers frisked Matthews but found
nothing. The officers then asked his name, and he said, “Cornelious Mat-
thews.”69 The officers asked to search the van, but he refused, stating the
van was not his.70 Based on Matthews’s refusal, the officers called for a
drug sniff dog, and Matthews became nervous.71 As the officers escorted
him to the squad car for further questioning, Matthews fled. After a pur-
suit, the officers caught Matthews. The drug dog arrived and alerted of-
ficers to marijuana and crack cocaine in the van.72
Matthews moved to suppress the evidence, but both the trial judge and
the appellate court concluded that he lacked standing to challenge the
officers’ search because he lacked a “possessory interest in the van.”73
Both courts also determined that reasonable suspicion supported the ini-
tial detention, based on the officers’ corroboration and the tip’s
credibility.74
On the issue of standing, the court of criminal appeals explained that a
person who borrows a car has an expectation of privacy in that car be-
cause the borrower has a possessory interest in the car, albeit less than
the owner’s.75 But a person who voluntarily abandons a borrowed car
loses his or her expectation of privacy in the car.76 Here, the officers cor-
roborated the tip and established the tip’s reliability by confirming the
vehicle’s description, its location, Matthews’s clothing, and his name.77 In
other words, the officer had more than the tip to support reasonable sus-
picion to order Matthews out of the van.78 And while Matthews did have
an expectation of privacy in the borrowed van, he lost that expectation of
privacy once he abandoned the van by fleeing.79
66. Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).





72. Id. at 601.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 607 (explaining that by virtue of being in the place legitimately, having com-
plete dominion and control and the right to exclude others, taking normal precautions to
seek privacy before the intrusion, using the car for private use, and the accused’s claim of
privacy, are all consistent with historical notions of privacy).
76. Id. at 608–09.
77. Id. at 605.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 610.
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On the issue of reasonable suspicion, the court of criminal appeals held
that based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers had sufficient
facts to support reasonable suspicion to detain Matthews.80 In reaching
this conclusion, the court of criminal appeals explained, “detention must
be ‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.’”81 While an officer must confirm or dispel
suspicions quickly, the detention “may continue for a reasonable period
of time until the officers have confirmed or dispelled their original suspi-
cion of criminal activity.”82
3. Fernandez v. California
The Fernandez Court decided whether one resident can consent to a
police home search after another resident refuses and is arrested.83 Here,
an officer received a report of a gang related robbery. When officers ar-
rived at the scene, a man directed them to a nearby building the suspect
occupied. The officers went into the building and heard what sounded
like a domestic dispute.84 The officers knocked on the door and a crying
woman with marks and blood answered the door. The officers asked if
they could enter the apartment, but Fernandez appeared and refused the
officers’ entry.85 Believing Fernandez caused the woman’s injuries, the
officers arrested him and took him to the station. The officers returned
and asked the woman if they could search the home and she consented.86
The search produced evidence of Fernandez’s gang membership, weap-
ons, and the clothes the robber reportedly wore. Fernandez moved to
suppress the evidence, but the trial judge denied the motion.87 The court
of appeals affirmed and the California Supreme Court denied review.88
Adding to the contours of warrantless searches and seizures prece-
dents, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “[a]n occupant who is absent
due to a lawful detention or arrest stands in the same shoes as an occu-
pant who is absent for any other reason.”89 In United States v. Matlock,
the Supreme Court explained that a warrantless search was permissible
because, “the consent of one who possesses common authority over
premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person
with whom that authority is shared.”90 In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Su-
preme Court held that a woman who falsely claimed to be a resident of
80. Id. at 605.
81. Id. at 603 (quoting Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
82. Id. (citing Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245).




87. Id. at 1131.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1134.
90. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974) (finding the woman’s consent
was sufficient for the warrantless search when the defendant and the woman lived
together).
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an apartment lacked common authority.91 But under the apparent au-
thority doctrine, the Supreme Court concluded the entry lawful because
the police reasonably believed that the woman was a resident after she
referred to the residence as “our apartment.”92 In Georgia v. Randolph,
however, the Court held that when the objecting resident is present and
expressly refuses the search, a warrantless search is unlawful.93 Unlike in
Randolph, the Fernandez Court explained that a continuing refusal to
consent to a search (1) is impractical; (2) is inconsistent with Randolph’s
logic; and (3) would deny the other occupants’ rights over the home.94
Therefore, a co-tenant’s consent to a police search, in the absence of the
refusing co-tenant, may suffice for a warrantless search.95
The decisions in Patel and Matthews clarify who can raise Fourth
Amendment challenges and how courts review those challenges.96 Even
though Fourth Amendment facial challenges are difficult to raise success-
fully, Patel demonstrates it can be done.97 Moreover, Matthews clarifies
that ownership is not the end of the inquiry when determining whether an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.98 Finally, Fernandez
further elaborates how a co-tenant’s consent or refusal to a search applies
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.99
B. GENERAL SCOPE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
As demonstrated above, the Fourth Amendment applies when the gov-
ernment or its agent seizes either property or a person, not when a pri-
vate actor does so independent of the government.100 Seizure includes
any meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interest.101 A
person is considered seized when a reasonable person would believe that
the individual was not free to leave based on the totality of the circum-
stances.102 The government is required to obtain a warrant supported by
91. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 179 (1990).
92. Id. at 179, 188–89.
93. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122–23 (2006) (finding that a wife’s consent to
a search was insufficient for a warrantless search of drug evidence in the house).
94. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1135–36. But cf. id. at 1139 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (ap-
plying Randolph with the opposite effect and finding the Court dispensed with the warrant
requirement).
95. See id. at 1137 (majority opinion).
96. See City of L.A. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2447 (2015); Matthews v. State, 431
S.W.3d 596, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
97. See Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2447.
98. See Matthews, 431 S.W.3d at 599.
99. See Patel, 134 S. Ct. at 1137.
100. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
101. See, e.g., Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1139 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (finding the government’s warrantless intrusion violated the Fourth Amendment).
102. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 414 S.W.3d 184, 193–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (deter-
mining a police encounter was non-consensual because “a reasonable person would not
have felt free to leave” and thus constituted a detention when an officer shined a bright
spotlight on the Johnson who was in a parked car; partially blocked Johnson, in a way that
would have forced Johnson to maneuver around the officer’s car; used a loud authoritative
voice; and demanded Johnson’s identification).
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probable cause before searching or seizing either property or person.103
Warrants are required to search homes;104 closed containers not in vehi-
cles;105 vehicles via GPS tracking;106 digital cell phone data;107 and possi-
bly an arrestee’s blood in driving under the influence cases.108 Search and
arrest warrants require: (1) a neutral and detached magistrate; (2) sworn
police affidavits; (3) probable cause to believe that evidence of a specific
crime will be found in the place searched; and (4) a description of the
place to be searched and the things to be seized with particularity.109 If
the information comes from an informant, an officer must be able to
show the informant’s basis of knowledge and the informant’s veracity
based on the totality of the circumstances.110
C. REASONABLE SUSPICION AND PROBABLE CAUSE
The Fourth Amendment provides the parameters for police interac-
tions with citizens. Consensual encounters do not raise any constitutional
issues;111 nonconsensual encounters do. Temporary investigative deten-
tions, or Terry stops, are permissible only when the officer has reasonable
suspicion that the detainee is engaged, has been engaged, or is about to
engage in criminal activity.112 Probable cause is required for an officer to
(1) arrest an individual without a warrant;113 (2) conduct a warrantless
vehicle search;114 or (3) obtain a search or arrest warrant.115 The cases
below detail how both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals reviewed different facts to find whether reasonable sus-
picion or probable cause existed.
1. Navarette v. California
Investigative traffic stops are permissible when the officer has reasona-
ble suspicion.116 Reasonable suspicion justifying a stop depends on the
officer’s information and the information’s credibility.117 The test re-
quires examining the totality of the circumstances and finding more than
a hunch but less than a probable cause.118 And while a stop need not be
based on an officer’s observation alone, “an anonymous tip alone seldom
103. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
104. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
105. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).
106. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 946–47 (2012).
107. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492–93 (2014).
108. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013).
109. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968).
110. Id. at 21.
111. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983).
112. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22.
113. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
114. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991).
115. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983).
116. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (citing United States v. Cor-
tez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22).
117. Id. (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).
118. Id. (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
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demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.”119 By its
very nature, an anonymous tipper’s credibility is unknown but “can
demonstrate ‘sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspi-
cion to make [an] investigatory stop.’”120
In Navarette, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that an anonymous
tip had the requisite indicia of reliability to support reasonable suspicion
and that the tip, being reliable, would provide a reasonable officer with
reasonable suspicion of drunk driving.121 There, police dispatch received
an anonymous tip that reported a vehicle’s make and model, license plate
number, and location.122 The tipster also complained that the driver ran
the tipster off the road. Dispatch then relayed that information to nearby
patrolling officers.123 After the police stopped the vehicle occupied by the
driver and Navarette, the officers smelled marijuana. The officers ar-
rested both the driver and Navarette after the officers searched the car
and found thirty pounds of marijuana. Navarette moved to suppress the
evidence, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffic
stop.124 On appeal, the court affirmed and found that the anonymous tip,
coupled with the officer’s corroboration, was sufficiently reliable to jus-
tify the stop, and that the tip provided sufficiently dangerous facts that
warranted an investigative stop without any further officer
investigation.125
The Supreme Court emphasized that the caller had eyewitness knowl-
edge with the ability to identify the car’s make, model, and license plate
number, which the officers corroborated, and the ability to provide a de-
tailed account of the criminal activity.126 The information was especially
credible because, as in evidentiary law, “substantial contemporaneity of
event and statement negate the likelihood of deliberate or conscious mis-
representation.”127 The same reasoning justifies admitting excited utter-
ances or “‘statement[s] relating to a startling event’ . . . ‘made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.’”128 The Su-
preme Court also cited “the caller’s use of the 911 system,” which has
caller ID safeguards against false reports, but it was careful to note that
119. White, 496 U.S. at 329.
120. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1688 (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 327). Compare White, 496
U.S. at 330–31 (finding an anonymous tipper’s information providing predictable informa-
tion corroborated by police made the tip credible, supporting reasonable suspicion), with
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (determining no reasonable suspicion existed
where there was no basis making the tip credible because the tip lacked familiarity with the
suspect, the suspect’s affairs, or predictions about future conduct).
121. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1690 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696
(1996)).
122. Id. at 1686.
123. Id. at 1687.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1689.
127. Id. (quoting Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 803(1) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which explains the basis for the present sense impression hearsay exception).
128. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(2)).
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911 tips are not per se reliable.129 In concluding that the officer acted
reasonably based on the totality of the circumstances, the Supreme Court
observed that the tipster alleged reckless or drunk driving—more than a
minor traffic offense—and that many of the officers had experience in
DWI detection.130
Justice Scalia’s dissent criticized the majority opinion for departing
from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by allowing an anonymous and
uncorroborated tip to support reasonable suspicion.131 He took issue with
how the majority characterized the tip as reliable simply because it pro-
vided intimate and unobservable knowledge.132 In his view, the tip pro-
vided only general knowledge that “everyone in the world who saw the
car would have . . . and anyone who wanted the car stopped would have
to provide that information.”133
Scalia also criticized the majority’s reliance on the present sense im-
pression and excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule.134 These
types of statements are deemed credible because their immediacy pre-
vents the declarant from adding or detracting from their statement.135
Here, the tip lacked immediacy.136 Enough time passed to allow the tip-
ster to see the license plate, stop, write down the information, and dial
the police—all of which negate immediacy.137 Moreover, the same hear-
say exceptions have not yet been interpreted to determine that an un-
known declarant’s statements would be admissible, and it would be
unlikely that the law would find such a statement trustworthy.138 Finally,
911 calling systems do not establish trustworthiness because what matters
is whether callers are aware that the 911 system is capable of identifying
them, not that the system is doing so.139
2. Heien v. North Carolina
In Heien, the U.S. Supreme Court held that reasonable suspicion can
arise from a mistake of law when it is based on a reasonable misunder-
standing of the scope of a law’s prohibition.140 In Heien, an officer ob-
served a driver who looked stiff and nervous.141 The officer followed the
driver and when he slowed down, the officer only saw one brake light
illuminate. The officer stopped the driver, believing that having only a
129. Id. at 1690.
130. Id. at 1691.
131. Id. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1693.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1694.
136. Id.
137. Id. (noting that seeing and remembering the license number would be a difficult
task after being run off the road while the car sped away, assuming that the tipper wrote
the information down and used her own cell phone).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014).
141. Id.
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single working brake light violated North Carolina law. While questing
the driver and Heien, the passenger, the officer discovered cocaine in the
car.142 The officer then arrested Heien and the driver for trafficking co-
caine. Heien filed a motion to suppress the evidence, but the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that an officer’s reasonable mistake of law
provides a valid basis for reasonable suspicion.143
The Supreme Court explained that reasonable suspicion is based on
facts the officer observes, the officer’s understanding of the relevant laws,
and the application of those facts to the law.144 An officer can be mis-
taken on either the law or facts and in either circumstance, “the result is
the same: the facts are outside the scope of the law.”145 Accordingly, the
result from a mistake of fact should not differ from a mistake of law.146
The mistake, however, must be reasonable:147 “the Fourth Amendment
tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those mistakes—whether of fact
or of law—must be objectively reasonable.”148 Indeed, another officer in
the same position might also think that Heien’s faulty brake light violated
North Carolina law.149 Officers who fail to diligently study the law will
therefore not be excused under the doctrine.150 Therefore, applying its
new gloss on reasonableness, the Supreme Court held that the officer’s
mistake of law was reasonable and did not violate Heien’s Fourth
Amendment rights.151
3. Rodriguez v. United States
The U.S. Supreme Court also addressed whether police may conduct a
drug dog sniff on a completed traffic stop without establishing reasonable
suspicion. The Supreme Court held that an officer may not prolong a stop
beyond its initial purpose to investigate absent additional reasonable sus-
picion of another offense discovered during the course of investigating
the traffic offense.152
Around midnight, a Nebraska officer saw a car drive onto the shoulder
of the highway.153 Because this action violated Nebraska’s traffic code,
the officer stopped the car, asked the driver for his license and registra-
tion, and asked him to step out of the car.154 The driver provided his
142. Id.
143. Id. at 535.
144. Id. at 536 (relying on Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 536–38 (discussing probable cause-like cases dating back to Chief Justice
Marshall taking into account reasonable mistakes of law as a justifiable basis if the mistake
is reasonable. See Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878); United States v. Riddle, 3 L. Ed.
110 (1809); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979)).
148. Id. at 539 (emphasis in original).
149. Id. at 540.
150. Id. at 539–40.
151. Id. at 540.
152. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1613.
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identification, but declined to step out of the car. The officer checked the
driver’s information and returned to his patrol car to check the passen-
ger’s information. Discovering nothing, the officer returned to the car to
issue a written warning.155 After issuing the warning, the officer asked the
driver if he could walk a drug-sniff dog around the car but the driver
refused. The officer then instructed the driver to turn off the engine, get
out, stand in front of the patrol car, and wait for another officer to ar-
rive.156 Once the second officer arrived, the officers walked a drug-sniff
dog around the car. The drug dog alerted the officers to a large hidden
bag of methamphetamine.157 Rodriguez, the driver, moved to suppress
the evidence, arguing that the search and seizure resulted from an unlaw-
fully prolonged traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff in the absence of rea-
sonable suspicion.158
The Supreme Court explained that a proper Terry stop duration “is
determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation
that warranted the stop, and attend to related safety concerns.”159 The
stop should not last any longer than is necessary to address the infrac-
tion—the purpose of the stop.160 Thus, “[a]uthority for the seizure . . .
ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should
have been—completed.”161 Granted, an officer “may conduct certain un-
related checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop,” but the officer
may not conduct the checks “in a way that prolongs the stop, absent rea-
sonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individ-
ual.”162 In cases concerning officer safety, Supreme Court precedent
justifies a brief or de minimis intrusion extending traffic stops.163 Citing
Arizona v. Johnson, which upheld an unrelated investigation lengthening
a roadside detention,164 the Supreme Court explained that the dangers to
officers accompanying traffic stops justify precautions that extend the
traffic stop’s duration for the officer “to complete his mission safely.”165
According to the Supreme Court, an officer deviates from his or her
mission when the officer conducts or attempts to conduct on-scene inves-
tigations into other crimes.166 These investigations do not involve a gen-
eral interest to stem crime or drug interdiction on the highways.167





159. Id. at 1614 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005); United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).
160. Id.
161. Id. (citing Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686).
162. Id. at 1615.
163. Id.
164. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009).
165. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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prolong the stop.168 The Supreme Court remanded the case to determine
whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the prolonged
detention.169
In the dissent, Justice Thomas opined that the officer executed the stop
in a reasonable manner.170 He noted that the stop lasted only twenty-nine
minutes and that the officer conducted ordinary traffic stop activities.171
He also pointed out that the officer called a backup for safety reasons.172
Under this reasoning, Justice Thomas believed the officer conducted a
reasonable and lawful stop.173 Therefore, the dog sniff did not transform
the stop into an otherwise illegal stop.174 Justice Thomas cautioned that
the outcome would lead to “haphazard results” because reasonableness
will be wholly dependent on how fast an officer can process a traffic stop,
either based on experience, access to technology, or efficiency.175
And focusing on the stop’s reasonableness as the central issue, Justice
Thomas drew a distinction between what is reasonable during a Terry
stop based on reasonable suspicion versus a stop based on probable
cause.176 An officer cannot prolong a stop based on reasonable suspi-
cion.177 But, a stop based on probable cause, as was the case here, is typi-
cally afforded “more leeway.”178
Thus, the take-away principle from this case is that officers cannot pro-
long a traffic stop beyond its scope to investigate other crimes absent
additional reasonable suspicion or probable cause, even for routine dog
sniffs.
4. McClintock v. State
Interpreting Florida v. Jardines, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
decided two cases addressing dog sniffs and probable cause affidavits:
McClintock v. State and State v. Cuong Phu Le.
First, in McClintock, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decided
whether a search warrant affidavit, removed of illegally obtained infor-
mation, sufficiently established probable cause for a search.179 The affida-
vit alleged that the officer received a tip of a possible indoor marijuana
growing operation on the second floor of a building.180 The officer lo-
cated the building and surveilled the first floor, a business with a public
access stairwell in the rear leading from a parking lot to the second floor.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1616–17.





175. Id. at 1618–19.
176. Id. at 1620–21.
177. Id. at 1621.
178. Id.
179. McClintock v. State, 444 S.W.3d 15, 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
180. Id. at 16.
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The officer later observed a male come and go before and after business
hours. Based on his experience, the officer believed this was consistent
with drug activity.181 When the officer approached the second floor’s ex-
terior, he smelled what he believed was marijuana, so he requested a
drug-dog. The dog alerted the officer of the drugs. McClintock moved to
suppress the seized drugs, challenging the search warrant’s validity for
lack of probable cause.182
The court of criminal appeals held that Florida v. Jardines required the
dog sniff to be excluded.183 It explained that when some of the informa-
tion in the affidavit must be excluded, a reviewing court must determine
whether there is sufficient information left to support probable cause.184
Based on the remaining information, the officer’s reference to “the loca-
tion” was ambiguous, even taking into account the other legally obtained
information, and did not clearly establish probable cause.185 The court of
criminal appeals remanded the case for a determination on whether the
affidavit was supported by probable cause absent the dog sniff.186 On re-
mand, the First Houston Court of Appeals held that the affidavit was not
supported by probable cause determining that the officer’s good faith re-
liance was not an exception to Texas’s exclusionary rule.187
5. State v. Cuong Phu Le
Unlike McClintock, in Cuong Phu Le, the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals held that the search warrant affidavit’s information supplied suffi-
cient probable cause.188 Here, a neighbor reported suspicious activity in a
vacant house. The officer had extensive investigatory experience concern-
ing indoor marijuana cultivation.189 The affidavit did not identify the
neighbor, but the officer knew the informant’s identity and that the in-
formant had a clean criminal background. Based on the tip, the officer
drove by the house and observed the tightly shut blinds.190 Investigating
further, he subpoenaed the house’s electrical utilities records, which listed
Cuong Phu Le as the owner. But, according to DPS records, Cuong Phu
Le’s address on his license did not match the utilities record.191 On a
separate occasion, the officer visited the house and heard the air condi-
tioner running even though it was cool outside. The officer concluded
that this was consistent with a hydroponic grow operation because the
181. Id. at 17.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 19–20.
184. Id. at 19 (citing Castillo v. State, 818 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 20–21.
187. McClintock v. State, 480 S.W.3d 734, 736 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015,
pet. granted).
188. State v. Cuong Phu Le, 463 S.W.3d 872, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), cert. denied,
Texas v. Cuong Phu Le, 136 S. Ct. 819 (2016).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 875.
191. Id.
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lights used to grow the plants generate a lot of heat. He then walked up
to the front door and smelled marijuana.192 Afterwards, the officer con-
ducted multiple night surveillances and saw no lights on other than those
on the front and back doors. He contacted another narcotics officer who
observed a car at the residence. When the car left, the officer conducted a
traffic stop. He noticed a strong smell of raw marijuana coming from both
the car and the driver, Cuong Phu Le.193 The officers then used a drug
dog to smell the car and the house’s front door. The dog alerted the of-
ficers to the front door of Cuong Phu Le’s house. Afterwards, a magis-
trate issued a search warrant and the officers found 358 marijuana plants
in the house.194
The court of criminal appeals held that, even without the dog sniff evi-
dence, there was enough information in the search warrant affidavit to
support probable cause.195 A “search warrant based in part on tainted
information is nonetheless valid if it clearly could have been issued on the
basis of the untainted information in the affidavit.”196 Here, the court of
criminal appeals reasoned that the tipster was reliable because the tipster
had no criminal history, had a clean driving record, and was an estab-
lished homeowner in the community for many years.197 The tipster also
remained accountable to the officer198 and provided enough information
for the officer to evaluate the tipster’s trustworthiness.199 Even more, the
officer corroborated the tipster’s information by observing the house and
Cuong Phu Le for several weeks.200 In fact, the officers smelled the mari-
juana odor themselves.201
D. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The Fourth Amendment requires officers to obtain an arrest or search
warrant from a detached, neutral magistrate.202 Generally speaking, fruits
of warrantless searches and seizures must be suppressed.203 However,
there are many exceptions to the warrant requirement that render evi-
dence admissible.204 Some exceptions discussed here include searches in-




195. Id. at 881.
196. Id. (citing Brown v. State, 605 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), abrogated
by Hedicke v. State, 779 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).




201. Id. at 879.
202. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967).
203. See, e.g., id. at 357 (holding warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (same).
204. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 n.19 (citing cases that chart other recognized warrant
requirement exceptions).
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1. Search-Incident-to-Arrest: Riley v. California
The U.S. Supreme Court recently confronted whether police can con-
duct a warrantless search of digital information on an arrestee’s cell
phone based on that person’s arrest. In Riley v. California, the Supreme
Court decided two cases concluding that police need a warrant for such
searches.205 In Riley, an officer stopped Riley because he drove a car with
expired registration.206 During the stop, the officer learned that Riley’s
license was suspended, and the officer arrested Riley and impounded his
car. The officer conducted a vehicle inventory search that revealed sev-
eral firearms. Another officer also conducted a search-incident-to-arrest
and found a cell phone and items on Riley’s person that associated him
with the Bloods street gang. At the station, an officer went through the
phone and found further evidence of Riley’s possible Bloods member-
ship.207 Later, the officer searched the phone again and found pictures of
Riley standing before a car that was suspected in another earlier crime.
Riley moved to suppress all evidence from the cell phone, but the trial
judge denied the motion.208 On appeal, the California Court of Appeals
affirmed because the cell phone search was incident to a lawful arrest.209
In Wurie, the second case addressed by the Supreme Court in its Riley
opinion, officers observed Wurie selling drugs and arrested him.210 At the
police station, the officers conducted a search-incident-to-arrest and
found a flip cell phone. Officers seized the phone and searched the
phone’s contents, particularly the call log and found Wurie’s home num-
ber. The officers also observed the background picture showing a woman
and baby.211 The officers used a phone directory to trace the home num-
ber to a physical address and went to the apartment.212 Once there, of-
ficers saw Wurie’s last name on the mailbox and a woman in the window
who looked like the one in the background picture.213 The officers ob-
tained a search warrant and discovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, fire-
arms and ammunition, and cash.214 Wurie moved to suppress the
evidence because officers obtained it through an illegal search of his
phone.215 The district court denied the motion.216 The First Circuit, how-
ever, reversed and held that cell phones are distinct under the Fourth
Amendment because of the amount of personal and private information
stored on them.217
205. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480–82 (2014).
206. Id. at 2480.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2481.
209. People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *6 (Cal. App. Feb. 8, 2013).
210. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–81.




215. Id. at 2842.
216. Id.
217. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013).
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The Supreme Court explained that the search-incident-to-arrest excep-
tion applies to achieve two primary goals: to promote and ensure officer
safety and to prevent evidence destruction.218 As a general rule, a search-
incident-to-arrest “requires no additional justification” if the suspect’s
custodial arrest is supported by probable cause and is reasonable and law-
ful.219 The search is limited to only the arrestee’s personal property
within his or her immediate control.220 But in the case of cell phones,
reasonableness needs to be determined by balancing the degree of intru-
sion on the individual’s privacy and the need for promoting legitimate
governmental interests.221
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that a digital data search of cell
phones incident to arrest violates the Fourth Amendment.222 The Su-
preme Court explained that protecting officer safety and preventing evi-
dence destruction are not concerns that exist when searching cell phone
digital data.223 While the Supreme Court has said that arrestees have a
diminished expectation of privacy,224 cell phones have large amounts of
personal data stored on them and thus, “bears little resemblance to the
type of brief physical search considered” in the past.225 The Supreme
Court distinguished cell phones from the usual items recovered in a
search-incident-to-arrest226 and explained that digital data cannot be used
as a weapon or to help the arrestee escape.227
Indeed, once officers secure a cell phone, there is no longer a danger
that an arrestee will destroy evidence.228 While there are ways to prevent
or restrict police access to cell phone data, either by remote wiping or
encryption, the arrestee cannot actively destroy evidence once under ar-
rest.229 If officers need to access digital information on an arrestee’s cell
phone without a warrant, officers may be able to rely on exigent circum-
218. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2483 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969)).
219. Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
220. Id. at 2484 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), abrogated by
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)) (finding a search of a 200-pound footlocker
violated the exception when compared to the search in Robinson where the officer discov-
ered a crumpled cigarette package in the arrestee’s pocket); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 332, 343, 350 (2009) (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)) (A search incident to arrest can include a vehicle
search “only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search,” and “when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’”).
221. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
222. Id. at 2485; see also State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)
(finding a cell phone search incident to arrest violated Granville’s Fourth Amendment
rights).
223. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485–86.
224. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013).
225. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
226. Id. (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343) (asking “whether application of the search
incident to arrest doctrine to this particular category of effects would ‘untether the rule
from the justification underlying the Chimel exception’”).
227. Id. at 2485–86.
228. Id. at 2486.
229. Id.
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stances but not a search-incident-to-arrest.230 Although arrestees have a
diminished privacy interest, a substantial invasion into their privacy may
still violate the Fourth Amendment and require a warrant.231 Cell phone
storage capacity and capability may reveal all sorts of private informa-
tion, making it unique under the Fourth Amendment.232 Moreover, cell
phones are ubiquitous.233
2. Exigent Circumstances: State v. Villarreal
There are some exigent circumstances that may justify a warrantless
search and seizure when supported by probable cause. The inquiry is de-
cided on a case-by-case basis, but the general principle behind the exigent
circumstances exception is to prevent evidence destruction or a suspect’s
escape.234 For instance, exigent circumstances will support a warrantless
search and seizure if the police are in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon.235
Until the U.S. Supreme Court decided Missouri v. McNeely, it was un-
clear whether dissipation of alcohol from blood constituted a per se exi-
gent circumstance, that justified a warrantless blood draw in DWI
cases.236 The Supreme Court declined to hold that mere dissipation of
alcohol from blood is a per se exigent circumstance, and instead held that
exigency must be determined on a case-by-case basis.237
In the wake of McNeely, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in State
v. Villarreal, addressed whether a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw
when investigating a repeat DWI offender, pursuant to Texas’s
mandatory blood draw provisions238 violated the Fourth Amendment.239
The court of criminal appeals held that such blood draws violate the
Fourth Amendment because the blood draws neither fall within the es-
tablished Fourth Amendment exceptions nor satisfy reasonableness.240
In Villarreal, the officer pulled Villarreal over and observed apparent
signs of intoxication.241 Villarreal refused to take any field sobriety tests
and the officer arrested him for DWI. After Villarreal refused the of-
ficer’s request for a blood sample, the officer from ran a criminal history
check on Villarreal’s name and discovered several prior DWI convic-
tions.242 The officer transferred Villarreal to a hospital and ordered medi-
cal staff to take a blood sample, despite Villarreal’s objections. In his
230. Id. at 2487 (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 1334 S. Ct. 1552, 1561–62 (2013)).
231. Id. at 2488 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766–67, n.12 (1969)).
232. Id. at 2488–89.
233. Id. at 2490 (explaining that about ninety percent of Americans carry a cell phone
daily).
234. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460–61 (2011).
235. See id. at 460 (citing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976)).
236. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013).
237. Id. at 1563.
238. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 724.011(a), 724.012(b), 724.013 (West 2011).
239. State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), cert. denied, Texas
v. Villarreal, 136 S. Ct. 2544 (2016).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 788.
242. Id.
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report, the officer stated that he had probable cause that Villarreal com-
mitted DWI.243 The tests showed a blood-alcohol concentration level well
above the legal limit.244 Villarreal moved to suppress the evidence from
the blood tests. At the suppression hearing, the officer testified that he
could have gotten a warrant for the blood draw but did not because the
statute did not require it. Villarreal, however, cited McNeely and the trial
judge granted his motion.245 The court of appeals affirmed.246
The court of criminal appeals charted every potentially applicable war-
rant requirement exception and found that none of the exceptions justi-
fied the warrantless search.247 First, looking at the relevant statutes, the
court of criminal appeals explained that the “statutory scheme appears to
‘extinguish’ a suspect’s right to refuse to submit a specimen” if certain
aggravating factors are present.248 The court of criminal appeals rejected
the State’s arguments concerning consent because, in order for consent to
be valid, an individual must have the ability to freely give, limit or revoke
that consent.249 And a valid Fourth Amendment waiver requires that a
suspect’s consent be voluntarily and freely given.250 Therefore, the statu-
tory provision providing for implied consent is invalid, particularly when
a suspect explicitly refuses to submit to such blood testing.251
Second, the court of criminal appeals applied the totality of the circum-
stances test and found a search must be reasonable.252 Over the dissent-
ers’ arguments that a general reasonableness theory applied, the majority
held that a search must fit into a recognized warrant requirement excep-
tion.253 The court of criminal appeals explained that exceptions applica-
ble to parolees and probationers were dissimilar.254 Neither United States
v. Knights255 nor Samson v. California256 stood for the proposition that
“the government may condition the granting of a privilege upon the
waiver of a constitutional right.”257 Instead, the two cases relied on a gen-
eral Fourth Amendment balancing test.258 In that same vein, the court of
criminal appeals also distinguished Maryland v. King259 because a veni-
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 789.
246. Id. at 793.
247. Id. at 798.
248. Id. at 795.
249. Id. at 799.
250. Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)).
251. Id. at 799–800.
252. Id. at 808–09.
253. Id. at 808–09, 811.
254. Id. at 812.
255. 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (holding that a warrantless search of a probationer’s
apartment was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
256. 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (holding that a warrantless search of parolee was reasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment).
257. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d at 802.
258. Id.; see Knights, 534 U.S. at 118; Samson, 547 U.S. at 848.
259. 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1977–80 (2013) (holding that the DNA information collected in a
reasonable manner, via buccal swab, not for the purposes of gathering evidence against the
suspect, and without officer discretion as to when the information is collected did not vio-
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puncture blood draw is a greater bodily intrusion than a buccal swab.260
Therefore, the intrusion in Villarreal outweighed the government’s inter-
est in curbing drunk driving.261
The court of criminal appeals further explained that the automobile
exception was inapplicable because the exception is “limited to the vehic-
ular-search context,” and does not apply to a search of the individual’s
body.262 Moreover, the court of criminal appeals declined to find that a
blood draw search falls within the special needs exception because the
exception applies “only in situations in which the existence of special
needs makes obtaining a warrant impracticable.”263 In the DWI context,
the blood draw’s primary purpose is to collect evidence against the sus-
pect for criminal prosecution, an impermissible basis for such an unrea-
sonable warrantless intrusion.264 The search-incident-to-arrest exception
was likewise inapplicable because such a search requires some sort of exi-
gency, such as preventing the escape of a suspect, assault of an officer, or
the destruction of evidence—none of which is a concern when trying to
collect information from a blood draw.265 Therefore, considering the
search’s reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances, the court
of criminal appeals explained that generally, “per se rules are inappropri-
ate in the Fourth Amendment context.”266
Third, the court of criminal appeals analyzed the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Schmerber v. California267 opinion, which permitted a warrantless search
and seizure based on exigent circumstances.268 Applying McNeely, the
court of criminal appeals explained that it determines exigency on a case-
by-case basis, considering the totality of the circumstances.269 Here, how-
ever, the court of criminal appeals did not find an exigent circumstance
that permitted a warrantless search.270 Thus, the court of criminal appeals
held that the search violated Villarreal’s Fourth Amendment rights.271
Despite the Villarreal decision, the question of exigency is still pending
at the court of criminal appeals. Before it decided Villarreal, the court of
criminal appeals granted petitions for discretionary review raising a simi-
late the Fourth Amendment); but cf. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d at 813 (distinguishing parolees
and probationers that have diminished privacy interests than that of suspects who have “no
ongoing supervisory relationship with any parole or probationer officer”).
260. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d at 810.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 805.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 807 (citing Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 535 U.S. 67, 84 (2001)).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 796 (quoting United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002)).
267. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
268. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d at 796–97 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770) (explaining
that the Supreme Court upheld warrantless searches based on exigent circumstances in
part because Schmerber was in an accident and “the officer ‘might reasonably have be-
lieved that he was confronted with an emergency in which the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence’”).
269. Id. at 797.
270. Id. at 798.
271. Id. at 815.
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lar exigent circumstances question.272 As of this writing, the court of
criminal appeals has not yet decided those cases and the state bar can
expect continued litigation on this issue.273
E. FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE
If the police exploit a constitutional illegality to obtain evidence, the
original illegality taints that evidence.274 And unless the conection be-
tween the illegality and the evidence is so attenuated, dissipating any
taint from the original illegality, that evidence will be suppressed.275 Typi-
cally, courts will look to the following factors to determine attenuation:
temporal proximity, intervening events, and intervening acts of the sus-
pect’s free will.276 For example, under the independent source doctrine,
evidence found in plain view during an initially unlawful entry but later
genuinely obtained independent of the earlier unlawful entry is admissi-
ble.277 Thus, if the police can show that they found the evidence from an
independent source, it may be admissible278 because it “breaks the causal
chain between the constitutional violation alleged and the discovery of
the evidence challenged.”279 Separately, under the inevitable discovery
doctrine, if the government can show that the police would have inevita-
bly discovered the evidence legally, the evidence may also be
admissible.280
1. Wehrenberg v. State
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently decided whether the in-
dependent source doctrine applied in Texas, and considered Texas’s ex-
clusionary rule as codified in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article
38.23.281 After officers received a confidential informant’s call and ob-
served house’s occupants manufacture methamphetamine, the officers
entered the house without either a search warrant or consent.282 They
arrested all of the occupants and did a protective sweep searching to find
evidence that the occupants made methamphetamine, but found none.
272. See, e.g., Weems v. State, 434 S.W.3d. 655, 657–58 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014),
aff’d, No. PD-0635-14, 2016 WL 299733 (Tex. Crim. App. May 25, 2016) (raising the issue
of exigency under a different provision of the same statute in Villarreal when an accident
results from a DWI causing injuries and sending people to the hospital); Cole v. State, 454
S.W.3d 89 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. granted), rev’d, 490 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016) (finding the facts insufficient to support exigency justifying a warrantless blood
draw).
273. Subsequently, the court of criminal appeals has decided both cases. See generally
Weems v. State, No. PD-0635-14, 2016 WL 299733 (Tex. Crim. App. May 25, 2016); Cole v.
State, 490 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
274. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963).
275. Id. at 491.
276. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975).
277. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988).
278. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 799 (1984).
279. United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 44 (1st Cir. 2001).
280. Murray, 487 U.S. at 539 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)).
281. Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
282. Id.
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Afterwards, the officers prepared a search warrant affidavit that included
only the confidential informant’s information and excluded the informa-
tion from their warrantless entry. A magistrate issued the warrant and the
officers found methamphetamine manufacturing implements.283
The court of criminal appeals held that the independent source doc-
trine applied in Texas and was consistent with Article 38.23.284 In reach-
ing its conclusion, the court of criminal appeals explained that while the
independent source doctrine applies, the inevitable discovery doctrine
does not.285 The court of criminal appeals found the inevitable discovery
doctrine inconsistent with Article 38.23’s requirement because the doc-
trine necessitates officers finding evidence unlawfully.286 This is because
the doctrine applies only in situations where the police conduct an unlaw-
ful seizure.287 Evidence found through an independent source means that
the evidence was discovered through lawful independent means, and
there is a “complete break in the causal chain between the illegality and
the acquisition of evidence.”288 On remand, the trial court held that the
evidence was admissible based on the informant’s tip.289
2. State v. Jackson
Examining what constitutes an intervening circumstance, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals in Jackson held that police verifying a fact,
independently, constitutes an intervening circumstance.290 And with the
unlawful search attenuated from the verification, there is no purposeful
and flagrant official misconduct.291 In Jackson, an officer observed a
criminal informant and Jackson delivered drugs in a Dodge Charger.292
The officer used that information to get a court order that authorized him
to install and monitor the Charger with a GPS tracking device. Using the
GPS device, the officer tracked the Charger from Colorado City to the
Dallas-Fort Worth metro area.293 When Jackson returned to Colorado
City, the GPS device alerted the officer that the Charger was speeding.
At the monitoring officer’s request, another officer independently veri-
fied that Jackson was speeding and stopped Jackson.294 Jackson con-
sented to the officers’ request to search his car, which revealed two
ounces of methamphetamine in the trunk.295
283. Id. at 462.
284. Id. at 468–69 (determining that the doctrine applies only where there is no causal
link between the illegal conduct and the evidence’s search and seizure).
285. Id. at 471.
286. Id. (citing State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 269–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
287. Id. (citing Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796, 799–800 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
288. Id. at 472.
289. See Wehrenberg v. State, No. 02-11-00560-CR, 2014 WL 890320, at *1–2 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Mar. 6, 2014, pet. ref’d).
290. State v. Jackson, 464 S.W.3d 724, 732–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 727.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 728.
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At trial, Jackson moved to suppress the methamphetamine evidence.
The trial judge granted Jackson’s motion and relied on United States v.
Jones,296 which held that installing and monitoring a GPS device on a
vehicle constituted a search.297 The trial judge found that the officers’
verification of Jackson’s speed was linked to the illegal GPS monitor-
ing.298 The court of appeals affirmed because the officers conducted a
warrantless search and only had reasonable suspicion, not probable
cause.299
The court of criminal appeals, however, reversed.300 The court of crimi-
nal appeals explained that evidence would not be suppressed “simply be-
cause it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the
police.”301 The court of criminal appeals reasoned that, as long as the
intervening circumstance comes between the “primary illegality and the
later discovery of evidence that is alleged to be ‘fruit of the poisonous
tree,’” the intervening circumstance is a factor a reviewing court should
consider.302 Here, the illegal search was not a product of flagrant official
misconduct because there was no evidence of the officer’s intent to disre-
gard Jackson’s constitutional rights.303 Rather, the officer had no knowl-
edge of the Jones precedent at the time of the arrest and had no reason to
believe that installing a GPS device on Jackson’s car was a search that
violated the Fourth Amendment.304 Moreover, a second officer verified
Jackson’s speed.305 This circumstance sufficiently constituted an interven-
ing circumstance that dissipated any taint resulting from the illegal GPS
monitoring.306 In short, the officer’s independent verification of Jackson’s
speed sufficiently broke the connection between the illegal search via the
GPS device and the methamphetamine evidence.307 Therefore, while evi-
dence found in violation of an individual’s rights tainted by an illegal
search is inadmissible, an intervening circumstance can lead to a different
outcome if the taint is dissipated.
IV. CONCLUSION
The biggest changes presented here were decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court and will significantly impact Texas’s jurisprudence. The most signif-
icant change in the last two years came in Fourth Amendment search and
296. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
297. Jackson, 464 S.W.3d at 728.
298. Id. at 729.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 734.
301. Id. at 731 (quoting State v. Mazuca, 375 S.W.3d 294, 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)
(quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963))); see also Johnson v.
State, 871 S.W.2d 744, 750–51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (providing that suppression is not
required if the evidence was not obtained unlawfully).
302. Jackson, 464 S.W.3d at 733.
303. Id. at 733–34.
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seizure law. Furthermore, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals continues
to grapple with the questions McNeely and Villarreal did not address, ex-
pressly. Other Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cases, while not always
establishing new law, distinguished and analogized unique facts in confes-
sions, searches, and seizures provided further clarity for the state bar.
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